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US politicsWestudy how foreign interventions affect civilwar around theworld. In an inﬁnitely repeated gamewe combine
a gambling for resurrectionmechanism for the inﬂuencing countrywith the canonical bargainingmodel ofwar in
the inﬂuenced country to micro-found sudden shifts in power among the domestic bargaining partners, which
are known to lead to war due to commitment problems. We test two of our model predictions that allow us to
identify the inﬂuence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence: (i) civil wars around theworld aremore like-
ly under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with the U.S. presidential ap-
proval rates. These results withstand several robustness checks and, overall, suggest that foreign inﬂuence is a
sizable driver of domestic conﬂict.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
There is a large and growing recent economic literature on the mo-
tives and consequences of civil wars, focusing almost exclusively on do-
mestic determinants. While the theory is devoted to understanding
why costly conﬂicts between two domestic parties are not deterred,
the empirical research emphasizes diverse country-speciﬁc factors
that affect the risk of civil conﬂict. Examples include slow income
growth, proportion of natural resources, secondary school attainment
(Collier and Hoefﬂer, 2004; Collier et al., 2005), income inequality
(Sambanis, 2005), poverty (Djankov and Reynal-Querol, 2008), ethnic
polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) or even the effect of
diseases (Cervellati et al., 2010). This paper complements the theoreti-
cal and the empirical literature by developing a systematic investigationce”. We are thankful to the edi-
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. This is an open access article underof the role of U.S. foreign inﬂuence as a determinant of civil (domestic)
conﬂicts in other countries.1
While there are many examples of civil wars characterized by
the involvement of foreign governments supporting one of the sides
in conﬂict, even before and after the end of the Cold War,2 identifying
the effect of foreign inﬂuence on civil conﬂicts is a challenging task.
Interventions in foreign conﬂicts are often secretive and indirect
and therefore unlikely to be fully reﬂected in available data. As an addi-
tional difﬁculty, many are the ways for foreign governments to inter-
vene in domestic civil wars. They can provide covert encouragement,
allow for (and promote) arms transactions, supply war intelligence
and resources, and give sanctuary to rebels or support a third
state that is also involved in the civil war. But even if the “right”measure1 The possibility of foreign inﬂuence has typically been overlooked in economic studies.
As a reﬂection, foreign involvement is not evenmentioned in themost recent and inﬂuen-
tial economic literature reviews on civil war (Blattman and Miguel, 2009; Collier and
Hoefﬂer, 2007).
2 Historical examples include U.S. support to factions in war in Angola (1972–1980s),
Nicaragua (1980s), Afghanistan (1979–1992), Peru (1980–2000), Congo (1996–1997)
or Liberia (1999–2003), among other examples; France involvement in the Algerian
(1991–2002) or Rwandan Civil Wars; or the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire
(1916–1918) instigated by theU.K. Regan (2000) identiﬁes 89 unilateral foreign interven-
tions into civil wars between 1944 and 1994; a period where 138 intrastate conﬂicts took
place. In a recent paper on the economic effects of U.S. interventions, Berger et al. (2013)
ﬁnd that more than 30% of countries were subject to CIA “successful” covert interventions
between 1947 and 1989. The interventions were “successful” in the sense that they
installed a new leader or preserved the power of an existing one.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
4 These doctrines basically justify interventions abroad by emphasizing the defense of
American values and the moral mandate of preserving (and installing) freedom around
the world. The doctrine elaborated by Monroe, and amended under Roosevelt's presiden-
cy, wasmore oriented to preserve American interests in thewestern hemisphere (Sexton,
2011);While both the democrat Truman and the republican Eisenhower justiﬁed the right
to intervene abroad as a measure to halt communism, Eisenhower was more precise on
the goals of U.S. foreign policy. In Truman's words “..it must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities
or outside pressures.” Truman (1947). In contrast, Eisenhower said that the United States
would give economic and military aid to Middle Eastern Nation as it was essential to pre-
serve this region from communism. As he put it U.S. intervention would “include the em-
ployment of the armed forces of the United States to protect and secure the territorial
integrity and political independence of such nations requesting such aid, against overt armed
aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.” Eisenhower (1957).
5 The voting behavior of Americans has been intensively studied (see Bartels (2010) for
an overview). While early studies claimed that votes were only determined by domestic
issues – stressing the importance of economic factors (see e.g. Lewis-Beck et al. (2008)
and references therein) – a more recent literature also emphasizes the importance of in-
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causality.
We propose a theoretical model that shows how a (foreign) third
party can trigger and prolong costly conﬂicts between two domestic
sides. This model extends the (inﬁnitely) repeated canonical
bargaining model of war where two domestic parties bargain how to
split the country's spoils and war – a costly lottery – is the outside op-
tion of the game. In our model, a foreign government decides in each
period whether to intervene by offering foreign support to one of the
domestic players before the domestic bargaining takes place. Whether
support is offered depends on the time varying internal political situa-
tion of the potentially intervening country. This makes the nature of
intervention ﬂeeting and always leaves one of the domestic parties
in a transient advantageous situation. This party might prefer war to
peace to lock in its momentary advantageous situation. The existence
of a foreign potential intervening country induces a commitment prob-
lem among the domestic players by leading to a sudden shift in power
between the incumbent government and the opposition which as
Powell (2006) has shown can cause civil war. Our model provides a
plausible example and a microfoundation of this sudden power shifts
by explicitly modeling the costs and beneﬁts of the potentially inter-
vening country.
We show that a foreign intervention is more attractive the lower
the personal costs of the foreign politician of going to war and the
lower his popularity. A foreign intervention can serve as a gamble
for resurrection for unpopular politicians. If the probability of re-
elections is associated with campaign contributions, a government
will increase its re-election possibilities by relying more on the support
of corporations which will make the government more likely to inter-
vene abroad to enhance business opportunities for these cooperations.
Moreover, a successful campaign can always be communicated by the
intervening politician and is likely to boost approval. Since political
support is bounded, this strategy is more attractive for unpopular
politicians: the potential gain in approval rates due to a successful
intervention is higher and the potential loss in approval rates is lower
should a failed intervention be discovered than for more popular
politicians.
Our empirical strategy consists of identifying and quantifying sys-
tematic domestic U.S. political factors as determinants of the incidence
of civil war in the rest of the world. According to our theoretical
model, government's ideology and presidential approval determine
the willingness to intervene abroad of a potential intervening country.
As these motives for intervention are mainly domestic, they constitute
an exogenous source of variation in the foreign inﬂuence received by a
country in (potential or ongoing) conﬂict. We ﬁnd that the incidence
and onset of civil war increase under Republican administrations and
decreases in the level of presidential approval. These results show
how the risk of civil war is affected by the political situation in the U.S.
and suggest that the international dimension of domestic conﬂicts is
very relevant to understand civil wars.
Why the U.S.? As we concentrate on civil wars that occurred
from 1937 to 1997, the U.S. is the natural candidate for a potential in-
tervening country. First, its superpower status and the size of its
economy provide it with sufﬁcient resources to intervene simulta-
neously in many countries during the period. Second, the data on
observed foreign interventions tells us that the U.S. has extensively
intervened in civil wars.3 Third, the U.S. is characterized by a two-
party system and, importantly, the two parties, Republican and
Democratic, have different views on the role of the U.S. in the inter-
national arenas. These differences are epitomized by diverse Repub-
lican approaches to foreign policy like the Roosevelt corollary of the
Monroe's doctrine, and principles present in the Eisenhower or Bush3 We mentioned examples in footnote 2.doctrines.4 This framework for foreign policy is rooted in the Repub-
lican ideology which differs from the general approach of the Demo-
cratic Party. As a consequence, the two parties systematically differ in
their propensities to intervene in foreign affairs. Fourth, there is accu-
rate data on presidential approval for the case of the U.S. Last but not
least, given the secretive nature of interventions in civil wars abroad
and the salience of domestic issues during election campaigns, the U.S.
citizens are unlikely to decide their vote based on domestic conﬂicts
in other (often distant and barely known) countries.5
While there is evidence that, consistent with the spirit of our model,
presidential approval is linked to foreign issues (e.g. Aldrich et al., 2006;
Hurwitz and Pefﬂey, 1987)), foreign policy issues only inﬂuence votes in
so far as the public has coherent attitudes about foreign policy and the
political parties uphold distinct foreign policy platforms and the foreign
policy issue ismade salient e.g. by themedia (Aldrich et al., 2006). There
is no indication that a civil war in another country becomes such a sa-
lient issue to affect the election of presidential candidates in the US.
Following recent empirical studies, we exploit panel data to identify
a causal link between politics in the U.S. and the incidence of civil war
relying on within-country variation. We adopt the empirical strategy
developed in Besley and Persson (2011) and estimate the effect of a Re-
publican government in ofﬁce and the level of presidential approval.
The results are striking and support our predictions. The incidence and
onset of civil war increase under Republican governments and decrease
with the U.S. presidential approval. Their impact is quantitatively im-
portant: the estimates imply that the incidence of civil war increases
by 60% under Republican administrations. Also, a fall of 1 percentage
point in the presidential approval rating rises the incidence of civil
war by 2%. These results hold when we concentrate on the onset of
civil war. However, these ﬁndings cannot be taken as conclusive evi-
dence that U.S. interventions caused or prolonged civil wars. There
may be omitted variables potentially correlatedwith both the U.S. polit-
ical situation and the incidence of civil war. Tomitigate this concern, we
control for aggregated demand shocks (proxied by the growth of gross
world product) and shocks in oil prices. We also address potential re-
verse causality problems. For example, it may be possible that the num-
ber of civil wars around theworld can cause political changes in the U.S.
by inducing citizens to vote for the Republican Party. Or that the Repub-
lican effect is driven by individual characteristics of the presidents, not
their ideology. To understand the logic behind the relationship between
civil wars and U.S. politics better we control for these potential sources
of concern with no effect on our results.
Of course, the U.S. is not the only country intervening abroad. The
Soviet Union during the ColdWar and France inﬂuencing its former col-
onies are other important examples. We control for the Cold War, theternational issues (see Aldrich et al. (1989)). Kessel (2004) analyzes the presidential elec-
tions from 1952 to 2000 using the American National Election Studies whose open-ended
questions provide a measure of valence toward candidate, party and issue objects in the
elections. He shows that in all 13 elections economic and general issues were extremely
important, but international issues also mattered in 11 of these 13 elections.
7 For theoretical models on the diversionary theory ofwar see e.g. Hess and Orphanides
(1995); Smith (1996); Tarar (2006).
8 For example, Ostrom and Job (1986); Morgan and Bickers (1992); Hess and
Orphanides (1995); Miller (1995, 1999) ﬁnd evidence for the diversionary theory while
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analysis. We show that even under the Cold War, the U.S. political situ-
ation has a signiﬁcant effect on civil war in the rest of the world, even
after controlling for the inﬂuence of the USSR though observed KGB op-
erations. We also show that this is not the case when we restrict our at-
tention to only former French colonies which provides additional
support to our identiﬁcation strategy.
We then explore a precise channel of U.S. direct interventions in
conﬂicts abroad. Given the secrecy associated with U.S. interventions
it is difﬁcult to claim they actually took place. However, the recent de-
classiﬁcation of successful CIA operations before 1990 allows us to test
whether these direct interventions operated by the CIA were an impor-
tant channel inducing domestic conﬂict around the world. We show
that (successful) CIA operations are more frequent under Republican
administrations and when presidential approval is low.
Overall, our results suggest that U.S. foreign inﬂuence is a sizable
driver of conﬂict around the world. Similar results are obtained in a
time-series analysis where we estimate the number of ongoing and
new civil wars per-year.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
discuss the related literature. The theoretical model is developed in
Section 3. Section 4 describes the data and reports the empirical exer-
cises conducted to test the predictions of the model and discusses the
role of the CIA as a channel of inﬂuence. Section 5 concludes.
2. Related literature
Unlike the economic literature, the political science literature on for-
eign interventions and transnational aspects of civil wars has been
growing considerably in recent years. The earlier literature used the
term foreign interventions mainly as referring to peace interventions
in ongoing wars (Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006; Regan, 2000; Walter,
1997). This clearly is complementary to our approach where the
foreign interventions trigger or prolong an already existing war.6 This
possibility was already mentioned by Gleditsch (2007), who argues
that motives for interventions in ongoing wars should be related to in-
terventions causing war onset. He provides empirical evidence of the
importance of ethnic, political and economic transnational linkages
among neighboring countries: the probability of conﬂict in a given
state is increasing in transnational ethnic links with the neighboring
states, decreasing in the democratic degree of political institutions of
neighboring countries and decreasing in trade integration with sur-
rounding states. Gleditsch (2007), hypothesizes that the link is via exter-
nal support of insurgencies whereas our model also works if support is
given to the incumbent government. Moreover, we move away from
neighboring countries in the strict spatial sense and consider the possi-
bility of politically/economicallymotivated foreign interventions in gen-
eral both theoretically and empirically. This is complementary to
empirical studies on the spread of civil war which point to conﬂict in
neighboring states, (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006) and the presence of ref-
ugees (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006) as a potential cause for civil war.
Foreign interventions in civil wars somehow blur the boundary be-
tween civil and inter-state wars. The question when a state prefers to
support insurgencies instead of going towar andwhich type of rebel or-
ganizations receive and accept foreign support has been analyzed by
Salehyan (2010) and by Salehyan et al. (2010). While this literature an-
alyzes the trade-off foreign intervention versus direct war, it fails to ex-
plainwhy the foreign state is interested in either type of aggression. Our
paper derives conditions for the endogenous occurrence of foreign
interventions.
In order to do so, we explicitly take themotives of politicians into ac-
count. We do not only look at purely economical motives but also at6 A foreign country could doboth, an openpeace intervention andproviding covert sup-
port to one of the sides in conﬂict. Our empirical results suggest that war interventions
dominate the peace interventions.political and personal costs and beneﬁts. One of the personal motives
we put forward is related to the “diversionary theory of war” literature.
A “diversionarywar” is a war instigated by a country's leader in order to
distract its population from their own domestic strife. This option is es-
pecially attractive to leaders facing a near inevitable removal from ofﬁce
since exercising the war optionmight enable them to signal a high mil-
itary or foreign policy ability.7 This incentive to gamble for resurrection
is also present in our model, however, the risk of the gamble is consid-
erably reduced due to the secretive nature of a foreign intervention.
Since the public is unlikely to observe a failed foreign intervention but
can be made aware of (or perceive the effects of) successful ones, one
might expect that domestic problems have a stronger effect on inter-
ventions in civil wars than on open aggressions toward other countries.
Indeed, we provide very robust empirical evidence of a positive link be-
tween low presidential approval rates in the U.S. and incidences of civil
wars around theworldwhile the enormous body of empirical studies on
the diversionary theory of war provides rather mixed evidence.8
Another personal motive we put forward is the personal cost of
going to war which we identify with being Republican or Democrat
when taking the model to the data. Our paper thereby adds to the
open controversy onwhether the U.S. foreign policy is based on a bipar-
tisan foreign policy consensus or is partisan (that is, conditional on
whether the government is Republican orDemocrat)9 byproviding sup-
port for the latter.
We heavily draw on the existing literature of the canonical
bargainingmodel of war (as e.g. in Dal Bo and Powell (2009)) to explain
why a foreign intervention can trigger or prolong an already existing
civil war into which we introduce a third party. Our model relies on a
new commitment problem (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2004, 2006). The for-
eign induced commitment problem we identify is another version of
Powell's argument that rapid shifts in the distribution of power lie at
the heart of war. Salehyan (2007) provides an additional argument: ex-
ternal sanctuaries in neighboring countries can complicate the underly-
ing bargain between states and rebels.
Our paper is also related to the recent literature on foreign inﬂuence
on domestic policy choices (Aidt and Hwang, 2008; Antràs and Padró i
Miquel, 2011) and the inﬂuence of foreign countries on the dynamics
of domestic political institutions. Aidt and Albornoz (2011) argue that
foreign countries may have an economic interest in sponsoring coups,
stabilizing dictatorships and facilitating constrained democratization
abroad in order to protect their foreign direct investment. Easterly
et al. (2008) estimate that (declassiﬁed) US and Soviet interventions
abroad have caused a decline in democracy across the world of about
33%. In Bonfatti (2010) a key trading partner may be interested to
keep an incumbent in power because the incumbent can be controlled
more easily from the exterior than the challenger using the threat of
trade sanction. Aidt et al. (2010) show the inﬂuence of IMF and World
Bank programs on political regime transitions.
As explained by Blattman and Miguel (2009), most of the empirical
civil war literature uses cross-sectional data and fails to exploit within-
country variation in panel data which leads to biased estimates by re-
placing time-varying explanatory variables by their cross-sectional
mean. Consequently, cross-country variation in these explanatory ob-
servable variables is confounded with cross-country averages in unob-
served parameters. To avoid this problem, our empirical strategy only
exploits within-country variations. This way, we follow a new series of
papers using panel data, mainly concerned by the effect of differentMeernik and Waterman (1996); Gowa (1998); Mitchell and Moore (2002) provide evi-
dence against it. Many of these papers look also at empirical evidence of acts short of war.
9 See, for example, Rourke (1984); Wittkopf and McCormick (1998); McCormick and
Wittkopf (1990); Meernik (1993); Souva and Rohde (2007); and Gowa (1998).
13 Later on wewill restrict parameters (Assumption 1) in such a way that in equilibrium
the low cost type L always ﬁnds it optimal to intervene, while the high cost type H never
does.
14 This personal component captures party ideology toward intervention, the party's
sensitivity toward lobbying and concern about corporation business opportunities. Amore
pro-corporation party should be associated with a lower (or even a negative) ci. Indeed,
there is evidence that this is the case for the U.S. where the Republican Party seems to
be more inﬂuenceable by lobbies than the Democratic Party (see, for example,
Jayachandran (2006)).
15 Approval matters because politicians derive ego-rents from being popular and be-
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proxies to capture income growth or wage shocks in order to address
potential endogeneity problems. Miguel et al. (2004) use rainfall varia-
tion to show a negative relationship between income and civil war in
Africa. 10 Brückner and Ciccone (2010) and Dube and Vargas (2013)
study the effect of changes in commodity prices in Sub-Saharan coun-
tries and Colombia, respectively. Besley and Persson (2011) use both
proxies in a more general study on the determinants of political vio-
lence, which includes civil war and state repression. They also show
how the effect of income shocks depends on political institutions. Our
paper builds on Besley and Persson (2011). We focus on civil war only
and include the novel dimension of foreign intervention.
3. Theoretical background
In this section, we provide a theoretical model based on the canoni-
cal bargaining model of war to illustrate how foreign inﬂuence could
lengthen a civil war or generate its outbreak. The model predicts
which political situations in a potentially intervening country are
more likely to cause an intervention and can therefore serve to identify
U.S. inﬂuence on civil war incidence around the world.
3.1. The model ingredients
We study an inﬁnitely repeated gamewith two long-run players and
one short-run player. The long-run players consist of two domestic
groups, the incumbent government I and the opposition O. The short-
run player is a foreign government with economic interests in the do-
mestic country.11 There are two types of foreign governments with a
known distribution, which differ in the political costs associated with
intervening abroad. At the beginning of every period of the inﬁnitely re-
peated game the type of the foreign government is drawn by nature.
Using a cost beneﬁt analysis for the current period the foreign govern-
ment then decideswhether or not to strike a deal with the opposition.12
This is observed by all players. The domestic parties then decide wheth-
er to peacefully split the country's spoils today or ﬁght taking the entire
future into account. If peace prevails, the game is repeated. A war ends
the bargaining game forever.
In the absence of a war the domestic country's per period spoils are
given byΠ. The shares of the spoils going to the incumbent and the op-
position result from bargaining. Bargaining failure leads to a destructive
war reducing the per period spoils permanently toσΠ. These remaining
spoils are fully kept by the winner of the war.
The probability to win the war depends on whether or not the for-
eign government has struck a deal with the opposition. Each domestic
group has ﬁxed resources for ﬁghting given by riwith i= I,O. In the ab-
sence of a deal the opposition's probability to win a war is
p ¼ rO
rO þ rI
ð1Þ
and increases to
pf ¼
rO þ r F
rO þ rI þ r F
ð2Þ
in case of a foreign intervention where rF are the resources contributed
by the foreign government.
A foreign government will only contribute resources to the war if
the total beneﬁt of an intervention outweighs its costs. We denote10 In a recent paper, Ciccone (2010) contends that this result is incorrect and ﬁnds that
rainfall increases the incidence and onset of civil war.
11 These economic interests can takemany different forms, such as foreign direct invest-
ment, trading opportunities, interest in natural resources, or interests grounded in geopo-
litical motives.
12 This assumption is made for the ease of exposition only. We would get qualitatively
similar results if the deal was offered to the incumbent government.the economic beneﬁts of a successful foreign intervention by ΠF. The
economic costs are identical to the resources rF that the foreign gov-
ernment provides for ﬁghting the war. Both types of foreign govern-
ment face the same economic costs and beneﬁts from intervention
but differ in their political costs and beneﬁts resulting in the low inter-
vention cost type L drawn from a known distribution with probability
λ and the high intervention cost type H, which occurs with probability
1 − λ.13 The political costs and beneﬁts are captured in two ways. On
the one hand, there is an ideological component capturing the strictly
personal costs ci with i = L,H of intervening in a domestic conﬂict
abroad.14 On the other hand, politicians enjoy different levels of
popularity/approval ui with i = L,H which can be affected by a foreign
intervention.15
A secretive foreign intervention affects approval rates through two
possible mechanisms. First, if the probability of re-election is associat-
ed with campaign contributions, then a government with low approval
will increase its re-election probabilities by relying more on the sup-
port from corporations. This in turn makes the government more likely
to intervene abroad to enhance business opportunities around the
world.16 Second, the secretive nature of foreign interventions makes
them a safe bet. An unsuccessful involvement in a civil war is likely
to go unnoticed by the public, while the head of government always
has ways and means to get credit for new economic opportunities
after a successful intervention even if the public does not know wheth-
er or not their country was involved. A successful ending of the civil
war may spur government's popularity because of the possibility of
signaling (e.g. by a state visit) global leadership and the new economic
beneﬁts associated with friendlier governments around the world.
Since approval rates are bounded from above, the marginal gain
from a successful intervention is higher for a head of state with
lower initial approval.
Also, the potential downside of the intervention is low risk,
because it only occurs if the intervention is unsuccessful and discov-
ered by the public and is smaller for governments with low approval
than for popular governments since approval rates are bounded
from below. The higher upside potential and the lower downside
risk make foreign intervention an attractive gamble for unpopular
governments.
Our model captures this gambling for resurrection mechanism
in a very stylized way. We assume that approval or reelection
chances jump up to uNui after a successful civil war abroad.
17 An
unsuccessful foreign intervention will only affect the head of
government's approval if discovered by the public which happens
with probability β resulting in a drop in approval to a minimum
level u b ui.18cause it determines future rents by affecting the possibility of re-election.
16 For example, Dube, Kaplan, and Naidu (2011) show that CIA operations to depose
leaders abroad increase stock market values of corporations beneﬁting from the perspec-
tive of a new friendlier government in the foreign country.
17 Assuming that the marginal increase in approval is bigger the further the distance of
initial approval with maximal approval would lead to qualitatively identical results.
18 Again assuming that themarginal drop in approval is bigger the further the distance of
initial approval with minimal approval would lead to qualitatively identical results.
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The foreign government is willing to intervene in a civil war abroad
if and only if the beneﬁts outweigh the costs. Formally, the foreign gov-
ernment intervenes if and only if
pfΠ
F þ pf u−uið Þ−β 1−pf
 
ui−uð Þ N ci þ r F ð3Þ
where resources rF are chosen to optimize Eq. (3). Any interior rF has to
satisfy the following ﬁrst order condition:
rI
rO þ rI þ r Fð Þ2
Π F þ u−uið Þ þ β ui−uð Þð Þ ¼ 1 ð4Þ
leading to
rF ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rI Π F þ u−uið Þ þ β ui−uð Þð Þ
p
−rO−rI
and
pf ¼ 1−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rI
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Π F þ u−uið Þ þ β ui−uð Þð Þ
p : ð5Þ
Substituting the expressions for rF∗ and pf∗ into Eq. (3) and simplifying
yield that the foreign government will intervene if and only if
Ψi ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Π F þ u−uið Þ þ β ui−uð Þð Þ
p
− ﬃﬃﬃﬃrI
p 2 þ rO−β ui−uð Þ N ci: ð6Þ
After inspection of Ψi, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1. The foreign politician's willingness to sponsor a civil war
abroad is increasing inΠF and rO and decreasing in β, rI, ci and u.
Proof. The comparative static results forΠF, rO, rI and ci are immediate
from condition Eq. (6). Simple calculations show that the left hand side
of Eq. (6) decreases in β. The change with respect to u is given as
∂Ψ
∂u ¼ −1þ βð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Π F þ u−uð Þ þ β u−uð Þð Þ
p
− ﬃﬃﬃﬃrIpﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Π F þ u−uð Þ þ β u−uð Þð Þ
p −β b 0:
■
To keep the model tractable, we impose the following assumption
Assumption 1. For the low cost type L with (cL,uL) condition (6) is sat-
isﬁed. For the high cost type H with (cH,uH) condition (6) is violated.
Assumption 1 ensures that the two types of foreign government be-
have differently in equilibrium. Only a low intervention cost type will
intervene if the intervention is accepted. We therefore need to show
when bargaining between the domestic players does indeed break
down due to the existence of a potential intervening country.
Importantly, the gambling for resurrection stage micro-founds the
following reduced form of our inﬁnitely repeated bargaining game: in
each period, the incumbent and opposition bargain how to split the
country's spoils where war is the failure of the bargaining process and
the opposition's win probability should the war occurs is pwith proba-
bility 1− λ and pf with probability λ. We now show under which con-
dition these potential shifts in power lead to a foreign-induced civil war
due to commitment problems.
3.3. The commitment problem
The existence of the potentially intervening country might cause
war both in the presence and absence of a foreign intervention today.
We ﬁrst study the situation when there is no foreign intervention in
the current period, namely Fit = 0. In this case, the incumbentgovernment ismomentarily strongbut there is the possibility of a future
power shift in the opposition's favor. Can the opposition induce the in-
cumbent not to exploit his temporarily advantageous position? The
value of war today for the incumbent is given by
πItðwar Fit ¼ 0j Þ ¼ 1−pð Þ
σΠ
1−δ
where δ is the common discount factor. The maximum that the opposi-
tion can credibly promise the incumbent in the future is the expected
entire spoils minus what the opposition can lock in tomorrow by
going to war tomorrow. The value of war tomorrow for the opposition
is given by
Eπ0tþ1ðwar Fit ¼ 0j Þ ¼
δσΠ
1−δ λpf þ 1−λð Þp
 
:
Today, the maximum that the opposition can give to the incumbent
is the entire spoils. Hence, the maximum possible transfer to preserve
peace from the opposition to the incumbent is given by
πItmax ðpeace Fit ¼ 0j Þ ¼
Π
1−δ−
δσΠ
1−δ λpf þ 1−λð Þp
 
:
The incumbent cannot be appeased if πIt war Fit ¼ 0j ÞNð πItmax
peace Fit ¼ 0j Þð , namely if the destructiveness of war is limited to
σ N σ I ¼ 1
1−pð Þ þ δ λpf þ 1−λð Þp
   : ð7Þ
Observe that the left hand side of Eq. (7) is decreasing in λ, so the
condition is most easily satisﬁed if there is a shift in power for sure to-
morrow. On the other hand, when no shift in power is expected, λ=
0, the condition can never be satisﬁed and peace prevails. Indeed, condi-
tion (7) can be rewritten as
λ N λI ¼ 1−σ þ σp 1−δð Þ
σδ pf−p
  ð8Þ
where p is given by Eq. (1) and pf is given by Eq. (5). Expression (8)
gives us a lower bound on the probability of a low intervention cost for-
eign government so that there are no credible transfers to maintain
peace and hence the bargaining range for peace is empty.
We now study the opposite situation where there is a foreign
intervention in period t, namely Fit = 1. The momentarily weak player
is the incumbent and we need to check whether it can buy off the
opposition in order to preserve peace. The value of war today for the
opposition is
πOt ðwar Fit ¼ 1j Þ ¼ pf
σΠ
1−δ :
The value of war tomorrow for the incumbent is
EπItþ1ðwar Fit ¼ 1j Þ ¼
δσΠ
1−δ λ 1−pf
 
þ 1−λð Þ 1−pð Þ
 
:
Hence, themaximum transfer it can credibly offer to appease the op-
position is the entire pie today plus the discounted value of the pie from
tomorrow minus Eπt + 1I (war|Fit = 1):
π0tmax ðpeace Fit ¼ 1j Þ ¼
Π
1−δ−
δσΠ
1−δ λ 1−pf
 
þ 1−λð Þ 1−pð Þ
 
:
20 Republican and Democrats differ in their position vis-a-vis isolationism as well. It is
important to clarify that isolationism refers to the U.S. reluctance to be involved in
European inter-state conﬂicts, which is no indicator of theirwillingness to intervene in for-
eign conﬂicts. In fact, and perhaps, paradoxically, isolationism is strongly associated with
the origin of U.S. interventions in Latin America, as exempliﬁed by the Monroe Doctrine
where it is established that Europe should refrain from inﬂuencing the Americas. See
Sexton (2011).
21 We refer the reader to the introduction for a justiﬁcation of these claims.
22 Additional speciﬁcations about the “intra-state wars” database can be found at Corre-
lates of War website: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.
23 As a robustness check, we use the UCDP/PRIO civil-war incidence measure. Although
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
or equivalently
σ N σO ¼ 1
pf þ δ 1−p−λ pf−p
   : ð9Þ
This expression is increasing in λ. It is easiest to satisfy when there is
a power shift for sure in the future, namely for λ= 0 and will never be
satisﬁed in the absence of a power shift λ= 1 Condition (9) can be re-
written as an upper bound on the probability of a low intervention cost
foreign government so that there are no credible transfers to maintain
peace:
λ b λO ¼ σpf þ σδ 1−pð Þ−1
σδ pf−p
  : ð10Þ
We have therefore shown that:
Proposition 2. In the absence of a foreign intervention today, the exis-
tence of a potentially intervening foreign government causes the incumbent
to go towar today ifλ N λI since the opposition cannot credibly promise suf-
ﬁciently high transfers to the incumbent to preserve peace. If, on the other
hand, the opposition receives foreign support today, the incumbent cannot
credibly promise sufﬁciently high transfers to the opposition to preserve
peace ifλ N λO. ForλI N λ b λO both commitment problems strike: a current-
ly strong incumbent and a currently strong opposition will choose war.19
3.4. Observable implications
Besides micro-founding our stylized inﬁnitely repeated bargaining
model Proposition 1 allows us to derive two testable predictions
concerning the political motives of intervention which we will use to
identify the effects of U.S. foreign inﬂuence. It states that a foreign inter-
vention is more attractive the lower the personal cost of going to war
and the lower the foreign politician's popularity leading to more pro-
nounced power shifts and therefore a higher likelihood of a foreign in-
duced commitment problem.
Prediction 1. Ideology matters: the probability of civil war should in-
crease if the head of the foreign government has a more pro-war ideology
and hence lower personal costs ci to initiate a civil war.
Prediction 2. Approval matters: The probability of civil war decreases
with the approval of the foreign government within its own country.
These predictions are important since they relate politics in the po-
tentially intervening foreign country to the probability of civil war
around the world. Moreover, it is easy to reinterpret our model so that
it generally applies to civil war incidence and not only to civil war
onset. Our model can describe a foreign caused prolongation of a civil
war where a potential intervening country interrupts the peace negoti-
ations in an ongoing civil war.
4. Empirical exercises
Our analysis shows that ideology and popularity both affect the in-
centives to intervene in conﬂicts abroad. We focus now on the case of
the U.S. as the source of foreign intervention. If U.S. foreign intervention
is a determinant of civil war abroad, and theU.S. propensity to intervene
depends ondomestic political factors, thenwe should observe that polit-
ical changes in the U.S. are systematically associated with the incidence19 Observe that the latter condition can only hold if σ N 21þδþp f−p ¼ 21þδþ rIrOþrI− ﬃﬃrIpﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃΠ F þ u−uið Þþβ ui−uð Þð Þp
.of civil war around the world. As long as political changes in the U.S.
constitute an exogenous variation from the perspective of the country
potentially in conﬂict, our predictions provide a way to identify the
effect of foreign intervention on the incidence of civil war.
Of course theremight be other countries willing to intervene in con-
ﬂicts abroad. However, the reasons for focusing on the U.S. are obvious.
As discussed in the introduction, (i) the U.S. is a global leader withmas-
sive economic and political interests all over the world; (ii) there is an
extensive record of U.S. interventions; (iii) the Democratic and Republi-
can government may differ in their foreign policies, and thus in their
willingness to intervene in foreign conﬂicts;20 and (iv) it is very likely
that the U.S. citizens vote without these interventions in mind.214.1. Data
In this paper, wemainly use the Correlates ofWar (CoW)measure of
civil conﬂict. More speciﬁcally, we identify the conﬂicts from the “intra-
state wars” database. Domestic conﬂicts are deﬁned as intra-state war
every time that there is sustained combat, involving organized armed
domestic forces and resulting in a cumulated death toll of more than
1000 battle-related people over a year. The beginning and end dates
of the conﬂict are both included in the CoW database. A conﬂict is as-
sumed to be over when sustained combat ends or when the number
of fatalities declines below the threshold of 1000 deaths. An additional
requirement for a domestic conﬂict to be coded as civil war is the “effec-
tive resistance” on both sides. This criterium is used to differentiatewars
from massacres and other episodes of one-side violence (e.g. govern-
ment repression), which are not considered to be the same phenome-
non as a civil war. Decolonization wars are not coded as a civil conﬂict
because they imply at least one foreign party involved in the conﬂict
(the colonizer).22 According to this deﬁnition, we construct a civil war
dichotomic variable (conﬂictjt), which takes the value of 1 (0) if a
country j was (not) engaged in a civil war in a given year. Otherwise,
conﬁlctjt = 0.23
Fig. 1 shows the incidence of civil conﬂicts between 1937 and 1997.
As Fearon and Laitin (2003) suggest, the secular increase in civil wars
during this period can be explained by the accumulation of unresolved
conﬂicts.
To explore the importance of the U.S. political situation, we use the
annual presidential approval rates (PAt) constructed byGallup. This var-
iable goes from 0 to 100, reﬂecting the percentage of surveyed people
approving the government. We also deﬁne a dichotomic variable indi-
cating whether the U.S. incumbent party is Republican (REPt = 1) or
Democratic (REPt = 0).
Table 1 reports some statistics describing selected relevant features
of the data. According to CoW, there were 93 new civil wars between
1937 and 1997, which lasted on average 6 years. 53 countries (30% of
the sample) suffered from at least one civil war episode in the 1937–
1997 period. Most of these countries do not belong to the OECD (94%).
Spain (1937–39), Greece (1944–45), and Turkey (1991–97) were the
OECD cases. There are around 9 (8.6) average conﬂicts per year andfairly equivalent (the correlation between both measures is very high, about 75% at
country-year level) and their use make no difference in terms of our results, which are
qualitatively the same and quantitatively very similar. We prefer using the CoWmeasure
as it covers a larger time span, which includes years before and after the Cold-War.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics (1937–1997).
Variable Obs. #
Civil wars
Mean duration of conﬂicts 93 6
(5.3)
Countries ever involved in civil wars (full sample) 180 53
Countries ever involved in civil wars (OECD countries) 30 3
Countries ever involved in civil wars (non-OECD countries) 150 50
Countries involved in civil wars (Cold War period) 180 42
Countries involved in civil wars (non-Cold War period) 180 37
Average conﬂicts per year (full sample) 61 8.6
(6.9)
Average conﬂicts per year (Cold War period) 40 9.0
(5.6)
Average conﬂicts per year (non-Cold War period) 21 7.9
(9.0)
Presidential approval (PA)
Average PA (all years) 61 56.3
(12.4)
REP
Years under REP 61 29
Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Fig. 1. Number of countries with ongoing civil wars per year (1937–1997).
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presidential approval of the U.S. government is 56.3% with a standard
deviation of 12.4. Republican administrations represented about 48%
of the period.
We also control for oil prices and other country speciﬁc economic
variables. Oil prices are taken from BP world energy statistics, which
are based on key crudes quotes from Brent, West Texas Intermediate
(WTI), Nigerian Focados and Dubai expressed in US$ per barrel. As in
Besley and Persson (2011), we proxy income shocks by exploiting the
(arguably) exogenous variation generated by natural disasters. They
construct their measure from the EM-DAT database.24 We deﬁne this
variable asNatural Disasterjt, which takes the value of 1 if a country j suf-
fers in year t from any of the following calamities: extreme temperature
events, ﬂoods, slides and tidal-waves. If none of these events take place,
Natural Disasterjt takes a value of 0. Statistics onWorld Population, GDP
and Per Capita GDP are taken from Angus Maddison's database.25
4.2. Preliminary evidence
Table 2 reports the average number of ongoing and outbreaking civil
wars (based on the CoW data set) under Democratic and Republican
administrations for the period 1937–1997.We also distinguish years ac-
cording to whether the incumbent had low (below themedian) or high
(above the median) presidential approval rates. The incidence of civil
war is about 51% higher under Republican administrations. It is also
32% higher when only the number of outbreaking conﬂicts is consid-
ered. In the second panel, we observe a similar increase in the number
of ongoing and outbreaking civil wars in years when the U.S. incumbent
suffers from low approval rates. The equality of means tests suggests
that the differences are statistically signiﬁcant.
4.2.1. Time series evidence
Another way to show the association between the political situation
in theU.S. and the number of conﬂicts around theworld is to regress the
number of ongoing and emerging civil conﬂicts (in logs) at t on REPt and
PAt. In Table 3, we display the results. In columns (1), (2) and (3) we
observe that the number of conﬂicts is signiﬁcantly higher under
Republican governments and negatively associated with the level of
presidential approval. In columns (4), (5) and (6), we observe a similar
result, although smaller in magnitude, for the number of civil war24 EM-DAT refers to the International Disaster Database, created by the Centre
for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). For more information follow:
http://www.emdat.be/database.
25 http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/.outbreaks in a year. Observe that in columns (2) and (5) we control
for the growth of gross world product (ΔlogGWPt) and the results re-
main unchanged. Finally, we control for shocks in oil prices (Δlog Oil
Pricest) in columns (3) and (6). In this way, we control for potential
global demand and productivity shocks that might be associated with
the incidence and onset of civil war around the world.
While this analysis is suggestive, amore serious test of our theory re-
quires exploiting within-country variations in panel data to which we
turn next.
4.3. Panel data evidence
We estimate the incidence of civil war; that is, the probability of ob-
serving civilwar in country j in year t (conﬂictjt). To put our results in con-
text, we replicate the empirical strategy developed in Besley and Persson
(2011). Consequently, wewill mainly rely onNatural Disasterj,t, as an ex-
ogenous source of variation in per capita income.26
As discussed in Section 2, most of the empirical civil war literature
fails to exploit within-country variation in panel data, which leads to bi-
ased estimates. To avoid this problem, we only exploit within country
variations. Thus, country ﬁxed effects (γj) are used in all of our main es-
timations as in Besley and Persson (2011), Brückner and Ciccone (2010)
or Miguel et al. (2004). To this speciﬁcation, we add our REPt and PAt
variables.
The main difﬁculty with our empirical strategy is that both REP and
PA are year (country-invariant) variables,whichmakes it difﬁcult to dis-
tinguish the effects of Republican governments or presidential approval
from any other country invariant year effect, like, for example, aggre-
gate shocks taking place at the world level in a given year. In principle,
this should not be a serious source of concern as long as the processes
followed by the political cycle or the evolution of preferential approval
in the U.S. are independent from the process governing the evolution
of the other relevant year ﬁxed effects, like global and U.S. productivity
or demand shocks or oil prices. In any case, to mitigate the risk of this
unlikely but potential problem, we include the growth of gross world
(ΔlogGWPt) product to capture aggregate demand or productivity
shocks. Furthermore, we also include in some speciﬁcations the U.S.
gross domestic product to control for economic shocks speciﬁc to the
U.S. (ΔlogGWPus,t). Finally, we also control for changes in oil prices26 Alternatively, we could use a directmeasure of growth in per capita GDP. As shown in
Table 4, the effect of the variables of interest remains unchanged.
Table 2
Number of civil wars per year (1937–1997).
Democratic administration Republican administration Difference p-Value
Ongoing conﬂicts per year (mean) 5.93 11.58 −5.6 0.01
(5.49) (6.96)
Outbreaking conﬂicts per year (mean) 1.21 1.88 −0.6 0.01
(1.34) (1.26)
High presidential approval Low presidential approval
Ongoing conﬂicts per year (mean) 7.78 10.29 2.5 0.01
(6.75) (6.5)
Outbreaking conﬂicts per year (mean) 1.31 1.87 0.55 0.01
(1.29) (1.31)
Standard deviation in parentheses.
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sources of civilwar thatmay be omitted behind our REPt or PAt variables.
We also carry out a great variety of robustness checks tackling speciﬁc
concerns and showing that our predictions do not hold in situations
where we expect them to fail. To summarize, we estimate different var-
iations of the following regression equation:
conflictjt ¼ α1Natural Disasterjt þ α2REPt þ α3PAt þ x0tβ þ γ j þ μ jt ;
ð11Þ
where x′ is a vector of additional (country invariant) year variables like
the mentioned ΔlogGWPt, ΔlogGWPus,t or ΔlogOil Pricet.
As we follow Besley and Persson (2011), we expect α1 to be signiﬁ-
cantly positive. More importantly for our purposes, Predictions 1 and 2
imply a positive α2 and a negative α3.
Finally,we have to dealwith thepotential problemof cross-sectional
and time-series correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004). To do this, we imple-
ment multi-way clustering at the year and country levels, which ac-
counts simultaneously for autocorrelation with a country, as well as
for correlation within-year across countries in presence of potential
geographic-based correlation (Cameron et al., 2011).
4.4. Main results
Table 4 reports our baseline results. In column 1, we report the most
basic speciﬁcation. Reassuringly, negative shocks in thewage rate or in-
come triggered by a natural disaster raise the probability of observing
civil war in a similar way and order of magnitude than in Besley and
Persson (2011). Importantly, the coefﬁcient associated with REPt is pos-
itive and signiﬁcant. The magnitude of the estimated effect is far fromTable 3
Number of conﬂicts per year.
(1) (2) (3)
Ongoing conﬂicts Ongoing conﬂicts Ongoin
REPt 6.031⁎⁎⁎ 5.953⁎⁎⁎ 5.762
(1.535) (1.556) (1.555
PAt −0.154⁎⁎ −0.152⁎⁎ −0.149
(0.0592) (0.0598) (0.059
ΔlogGWPt 0.455⁎⁎⁎
(0.154)
ΔlogOil Pricest 0.016
(0.016
Observations 64 64 64
R-squared 0.265 0.268 0.275
Robust standard errors clustered by year in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.trivial: with an unconditional probability of conﬂict of around 5%,
this corresponds to an increase of about 60%. We can also observe the
signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient associated with our U.S. presidential
approval variable (PAt). This coefﬁcient implies that a fall of 1 percent-
age point in the presidential approval rating increases the incidence of
civil war by 2%.
The effects of these two variables are robust to any modiﬁcation we
perform on the basic speciﬁcation. In column 2, we replace Natural
Disasterj,t by Δlog pcGDPj,t, which appears to be negatively associated
with the incidence of civil war. In the remaining speciﬁcations (columns
3, 4 and 5), we include ΔlogGWPt. This way we control for aggregate
productivity or demand shocks, which may be correlated with the U.S.
political party in ofﬁce. The associated coefﬁcient is negative but insig-
niﬁcant. In the following estimation (columns 4), we add ΔlogGWPUS,t,
which controls for GDP growth in the U.S. Including these additional
country invariant year variables has qualitatively no effect on neither
the way in which Natural Disaster (as a proxy of wage rate or income
shocks) or our main variables. Finally, we control for changes in oil
prices. The reason is that oil pricesmay affect both the political situation
in the U.S., through its effects on U.S. inﬂation, and the incidence of con-
ﬂict via inﬂation or, for oil producer countries, its effects on national in-
come or revenues. Although we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant positive
effect of variations in oil prices, a result interesting in itself, the inclusion
of this additional year (country-invariant) variable does not affect our
main results.4.5. Robustness
We perform a multiplicity of robustness checks, which we expose
according to different potential concerns.(4) (5) (6)
g conﬂicts New conﬂicts New conﬂicts New conﬂicts
⁎⁎⁎ 0.722⁎⁎ 0.694⁎⁎ 0.786⁎⁎⁎
) (0.320) (0.325) (0.318)
⁎⁎⁎ −0.028⁎⁎ −0.028⁎⁎ −0.030⁎⁎
0) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
0.162⁎⁎⁎
(0.0353)
⁎ −0.004
) (0.003)
64 64 64
0.136 0.144 0.152
Table 4
Baseline results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt Conﬂicjt
ΔlogpcGDPj,t −0.003⁎⁎⁎
(0.001)
[0.001]
Natural Disasterj,t 0.031⁎⁎⁎ 0.031⁎⁎⁎ 0.029⁎⁎⁎ 0.029⁎⁎⁎
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
REPt 0.033⁎⁎⁎ 0.03⁎⁎⁎ 0.034⁎⁎⁎ 0.034⁎⁎⁎ 0.032⁎⁎⁎
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
[0.018] [0.007] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]
PAt −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
[0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005]
ΔlogGWPt −0.077⁎⁎⁎ 0.056 0.06⁎⁎
(0.015) (0.076) (0.076)
[0.021] [0.129] [0.137]
ΔlogGDPUS,t −0.0179 −0.017
(0.053) (0.053)
[0.119] [0.118]
ΔlogOil Pricest 0.0001⁎
(0.0001)
[0.0001]
Sample All All All All All
Observations 6750 6750 6750 6744 6744
R-squared 0.302 0.303 0.303 0.298 0.298
All the speciﬁcations control for country-ﬁxed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
Robust Multi-Way Clustering by country and year in brackets.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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Our ﬁrst question is whether our results withstand changes
in sampling. Reassuringly, this is not the case. We begin by restricting
the sample to OECD countries. Of course, we donot expect U.S. inﬂuenceTable 5
Different samples.
(1) (2) (3)
Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt Con
Natural Disasterj,t 0.006⁎ 0.040⁎⁎⁎ 0.00
(0.005) (0.018) (0.0
[0.003] [0.013] [0.0
REPt −0.001 0.042⁎⁎⁎ 0.01
(0.001) (0.011) (0.0
[0.009] [0.022] [0.0
PAt 0.00003 −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0
[0.0003] [0.0006] [0.0
SOCtSW
CONtUK
ΔlogGWPt −0.133 −0.075⁎⁎⁎ 0.00
(0.099) (0.016) (0.0
[0.063] [0.022] [0.0
Sample OECD countries Non-OECD countries Fran
Observations 1242 5508 889
R-squared 0.102 0.304 0.23
All the speciﬁcations control for country-ﬁxed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
Robust Multi-Way Clustering by country and year in brackets.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.to matter for these countries. Column 1 in Table 5 conﬁrms this
presumption. In column 2, we restrict the sample to non-OECD coun-
tries. Clearly, this results in higher coefﬁcients associated with REPt
and PAt.(4) (5) (6)
ﬂictjt Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt
1 0.030⁎⁎⁎ 0.035⁎⁎⁎ 0.034⁎⁎⁎
10) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015)
15] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008]
2 0.034⁎⁎⁎
21) (0.010)
21] [0.019]
.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎
001) (0.0004)
006] [0.0005]
0.013 −0.006
(0.012)⁎⁎ (0.011)
[0.012] [0.013]
0.012 0.018
(0.009) (0.012)
[0.009] [0.014]
5 −0.077⁎⁎⁎ −0.071⁎⁎⁎ −0.069⁎⁎⁎
35) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018)
71] [0.019] [0.022] [0.023]
cophone countries All All All
6750 7750 6750
5 0.304 0.271 0.212
28 Notice that this result does not imply that the U.K. did not intervene in foreign civil
Table 6
Different speciﬁcations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt
Natural Disasterj,t 0.022 0.016 0.031⁎⁎ 0.030⁎⁎⁎ 0.017 0.044⁎⁎†
(0.013) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.022)
[0.014] [0.022] [0.013] [0.012] [0.017] [0.031]
REPt 0.037⁎⁎⁎ 0.018⁎⁎⁎ 0.038⁎⁎⁎ 0.029⁎⁎⁎ 0.054⁎⁎⁎
(0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018)
[0.012] [0.007] [0.016] [0.009] [0.02]
PAt −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004)
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0004]
ΔlogGWPt −0.063⁎⁎⁎ −0.065⁎⁎⁎ −0.077⁎⁎⁎ −0.072⁎⁎⁎ −0.055 −0.036
(0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.089) (0.026)
[0.084] [0.071] [0.076] [0.077] [0.133] [0.122]
REPtY1 0.033⁎⁎⁎
(0.009)
[0.017]
REPtY2 0.033⁎⁎⁎
(0.011)
[0.020]
REPtY3 0.036⁎⁎⁎
(0.010)⁎
[0.020]
REPtY4 0.034⁎⁎⁎
(0.009)
[0.021]
Cold Wart 0.014
(0.012)
[0.015]
Sample All All All All years Cold war years Non-cold war
Decade ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Year trend Yes
Quadratic year trend Yes
Observations 6750 6750 6750 6750 4575 2175
R-squared 0.311 0.316 0.303 0.304 0.506
All the speciﬁcations control for country-ﬁxed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
Robust Multi-Way Clustering by country and year in brackets.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
† p N 0.1 with Robust Multi-Way Clustering by country and year.
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our sample to former French colonies where we should not expect
strong U.S. intervention.27 If anything, these countries are inﬂuenced
by France. Thus, our results should not hold. As shown in column 3, nei-
ther REP nor PA are associated with signiﬁcant coefﬁcients, strengthen-
ing our argument.
Finally, in columns 4 and5,we explore the possibility that REP is cap-
turing something else rather than variations in the propensity of theU.S.
to intervene abroad. Given the strong position of the U.S. president and
the clear difference between the Democratic and Republican view on
the role of the U.S. in the international arenas, we believe that party ide-
ology should be more important for the case of the U.S. as a potentially
intervening country than for other countries. That is, we should not ob-
serve that the probability of civil war is determined by which party is in
ofﬁce in countries like, for example, Sweden or even in theU.K. Interest-
ingly, politics in those countries are also characterized by alternating
political parties with different ideology so we can create variables like
SOCtSW or CONtUK. These new variables take the value of 1 if the govern-
ment is conservative in the U.K. and socialist in Sweden respectively,
and 0 otherwise. Once we include these variables, the coefﬁcients asso-
ciated with REP and PA are still signiﬁcant and positive (column 4). This
reinforces the view that civil wars are inﬂuenced by the U.S. and that27 We thank Benjamin Cohen for suggesting this check.U.S. intervention is politicallymotivated.We see aswell that political al-
ternation in the U.K. and Sweden does not affect the incidence of civil
war. The proper falsiﬁcation test is displayed in columns 5 and 6 for
the U.K. and Sweden, respectively, where the US domestic politics vari-
ables are dropped.284.5.2. Different speciﬁcations
Weexplore different speciﬁcations in Table 6. In column 1,we report
an estimation with decade ﬁxed effects. We include a quadratic time
trend in column 2. These modiﬁcations do not affect the qualitative re-
sults, although the coefﬁcient associatedwith REP gets smaller and loses
some signiﬁcance once both decadesﬁxed effects and the time trend are
included. In column 3, we explore if the Republican effect is driven by
any speciﬁc year of the presidential term. We do so by disaggregating
REP in the ﬁrst, second, third and fourth year of a Republican term. All
the coefﬁcients associated with REPtY1, REPtY2, REPtY3, and REPtY4 are pos-
itive and signiﬁcant as we expected. It is interesting to note that the co-
efﬁcient associated with each year of a Republican term is similar. If
anything, the coefﬁcients of the last two years are slightly higher,wars. It only implies that the political orientation of the party in power in the U.K. does
not determine the probability of a U.K. intervention. The sign of the conservative dummy
is positive but not signiﬁcant, implying as expected that foreign interventions by the U.K.
are not very sensitive to the party in power.
Table 7
Alternative stories.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt
Natural Disasterj,t 0.018⁎ 0.016⁎⁎⁎† 0.031⁎⁎ 0.031⁎⁎ 0.023 0.022
(0.013) (0.004) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
[0.015] [0.021] [0.013] [0.013] [0.021] [0.02]
REPt 0.021⁎⁎ 0.011⁎⁎⁎ 0.033⁎⁎⁎ 0.032⁎⁎⁎ 0.03⁎⁎⁎ 0.029⁎⁎⁎
(0.008) (0.005) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09)
[0.008] [0.006] [0.019] [0.019] [0.09] [0.011]
PAt −0.001⁎⁎ −0.001⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎ −0.001⁎⁎
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
[0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0004]
ΔlogGWPt −0.071⁎⁎⁎† −0.071⁎⁎⁎† −0.077⁎⁎⁎ −0.076⁎⁎⁎ −0.064 0.110⁎†
(0.013) (0.023) (0.015) (0.017) (0.071) (0.06)
[0.073] [0.071] [0.076] [0.078] [0.141] [0.127]
NCWEY 0.004⁎⁎⁎
(0.001)
[0.001]
NCWt– 1 0.005⁎⁎⁎
(0.0004)
[0.001]
KGBjt 0.264⁎
(0.158)
[0.258]
NKGBt 0.003⁎⁎,†
(0.001)
[0.002]
Sample Excluding R. Reagan Excluding L. Johnson Cold war years Cold war years
Observations 6750 6750 5602 6116 4870 4870
R-squared 0.314 0.316 0.303 0.325 0.35 0.333
All the speciﬁcations control for country-ﬁxed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
Robust Multi-Way Clustering by country and year in brackets.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
† p N 0.1 with Robust Multi-Way Clustering by country and year.
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during the ﬁrst years in ofﬁce.
We ﬁnally explore whether our results are driven by the Cold War.
In column (4), we add a dummy to differentiate this period. In line
with the literature, we do not ﬁnd a direct effect of the Cold War on
civil war (Collier et al., 2005).29We also observe that our results remain
unchanged. However, given that including decadeﬁxed effects and time
trends reduce themagnitude of the Republican and Approval effects,we
aim at clarifying how these effects vary across the Cold War and Non-
Cold War years. In columns (5) and (6) we restrict the sample to Cold
War years and Non-Cold War years, respectively. Note ﬁrst that the
sign and the signiﬁcance of REP and PA remain similar across both pe-
riods. Notice, however, that the magnitude of the Republican effect is
relatively lower in Cold War era. Under the shadow of war with the
USSR, it is possible that the U.S.'s decision to intervene abroad be less
sensitive to domestic political changes. On the other hand, this fact, if
true, does not imply the absence of nuance in the degree of anticommu-
nismbetweenDemocrats andRepublics. In fact, the sign associatedwith
REP in the Cold War sample is still signiﬁcantly positive. Moreover, the
anticommunist threat might be overstated by a unpopular incumbent.
Thus, there is no reason to expect the effect of PA to change. Our results
are consistent with this view: the possibility that the appeal of foreign
intervention during low approval years remains unchanged no matter
if the U.S. be engaged in the Cold War or not.29 The Cold War has other important effects on civil war. In a recent paper, Balcells and
Kalyvas (2010) show that the effect of the ColdWar is to shape the form, not the incidence,
of civil war. For example, they show that insurgence (guerrillas or irregular wars) is the
dominant form of conﬂict only during the Cold War.4.5.3. Alternative stories
Our results might be suffering from a reverse causality problem:
could it be the case that American citizens feel in danger if there are
toomany civil wars around theworld and seek safety by voting for a Re-
publican candidate? We address this potential problem by controlling
for the number of civil wars taking place during presidential election
years (NCWEY). As reported in column 1 of Table 7, the estimates of
the Republican and Presidential Approval effects come out virtually
the same.
We also control for the intensity of conﬂicts around theworld by in-
cluding the number of civil wars in the previous year (NCWt − 1). The
results displayed in column (2) show that this has no effect on our
results.
Importantly, theRepublican effectmight be driven by particularly in-
terventionist presidents independently of their party ideology. If partic-
ularly aggressive presidents happened to be Republican, then wewould
be reﬂecting the spurious impression that Republicans are more prone
to intervene in foreign civil wars. For example, the U.S. presidential
term during which the world suffered the highest number of civil war
took place under Ronald Reagan. To control for this, we run all the re-
gressions excluding one US president at the time. We don't report all
the regressions to save space. In any case, none of these exclusions af-
fected the results. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 report the regressions ex-
cluding Ronald Reagan and Lyndon B. Johnson, respectively.
So far, we have not considered the actions of the USSR during the
Cold War period. This is important for at least three reasons: ﬁrst, it is
possible that U.S. interventions be the reaction to an intensiﬁcation of
the USSR political activism across the world. Second, it is also plausible
that harder USSR interventions raise the appeal of Republican candi-
dates. Finally, the USSR may also directly induce conﬂicts around the
Table 8
IV estimates: presidential approval.
(1) (2)
Dependent variable 2SLS estimates
Conﬂictjt Conﬂictjt
PAt −0.002⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎
(0.001) (0.001)
REPt 0.042⁎⁎⁎
(0.007)
Dependent variable First stage estimates
PAt
ΔlogGDPUS,t 0.70⁎⁎⁎ 0.72⁎⁎
(0.039) (0.038)
Inﬂation rateUS,t −1.151⁎⁎⁎ −1.150⁎⁎⁎
(0.043) (0.042)
First stage F-statistic: 302 17.67
Controls
Natural Disasterj,t Y Y
ΔlogGWPt Y Y
Country FE Y Y
Observations 5502 5502
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
31 Most of these are reported in Albornoz and Hauk (2010) or available upon request.
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lican elections and civil conﬂict. If this is the case, there is a potential
endogeneity problem that would bias the coefﬁcient estimations. To
mitigate this concern, we control for USSR inﬂuence during the Cold
War by including a measure of KGB interventions. This variable KGBjt
takes the value of 1 if country j suffers from successful KGB actions in
year t. We borrow this variable from Berger et al. (2013). They use his-
torical studies to identify KGB interventions and apply an analogous
methodology to CIA interventions, which we explain in further detail
in Section 4.7. In column (5) of Table 7, we report our baseline estima-
tion restricting the sample to Cold War years and including KGBjt in
the regression. The effect of KGBjt is signiﬁcant and positive at the 10%
level, which suggests that KGB operations did have direct effect on the
incidence of civil in countries where they took place. Importantly, con-
trolling for their inﬂuence does not affect the coefﬁcients associated
with either REPt or PAt in a relevant way. Furthermore, KGB interven-
tions may reﬂect a climate of world conﬂict. To control for this, we de-
ﬁne NKGBt as the total number of KGB interventions in year t. The
result of including this variable is displayed in Column (6) of Table 7.
The coefﬁcient associatedwith NKGBt is signiﬁcant, although not robust
to multi-way clustering by year and country. Again, our key results re-
sist the inclusion of controls for potential alternative stories.32 We leave the other controls unreported to save space. They are available upon request.
33 The fact that the results are relativelyweakerwas to be expected according to our the-
ory and the constraint imposed by fewer observations.
34 The identiﬁcation of CIA interventionswas based on a detailed study of historical doc-
uments of the Cold War, based on recently declassiﬁed documents. This measure is con-
structed as a dichotomous variable which equal one, in a country and year, if there was
a successful intervention undertaken by the CIA. The panel is unbalanced, since a country
does not enter the sample until its independence. Countrieswhich are split ormerged dur-
ing the Cold War period are considered as new countries. These interventions are either
associated to the successful installation of a new leader by the CIA or to the CIA providing
covert support to the incumbent regime in a certain country and year. In the ﬁrst case, rel-
evant examples are the CIA-backed coup d'éat in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954 and
Chile in 1973, where the incumbent leader was deposed and a new leader gained power.
The second case can be illustrated by the covert support by the CIA to the government of
Pinochet in Chile, between 1973 and 1988. In those cases where the party supported by
the CIA did not managed to gain power, the variable is coded as zero, as in the case of
Angola during the analyzed period. CIA interventions were more frequent in Latin
America. However, countries in Africa, Asia, Middle East and even Europe (such as Italy4.5.4. Instrumented presidential approval
Presidential approval ratesmight be plagued by another source of re-
verse causality: Americans may perceive that a world with greater civil
wars represents a failure of American foreign diplomacy and peacekeep-
ing efforts and punish the American president with lower approval. To
tackle this concern, we instrument presidential approval ratings by in-
ﬂation and GDP growth in the U.S. (Inﬂation rateUS,t and ΔlogGDPUS,t),
which are clearly unrelated to international events.30 In Table 8 we re-
port the results for the 2SLS estimation. Inﬂation and economic growth
appear as valid instruments for presidential approval in the U.S. Impor-
tantly, the second-stage estimates suggest that the instrumented PA var-
iable is negatively associated with the incidence of civil war. Observe as
well, that the effect of REP remains the same.30 See Berlemann and Enkelmann (2012), for a survey of the determinants of U.S. pres-
idential approval.4.5.5. Other robustness checks
We have also run a great variety of unreported additional
regressions.31 These are as follows: (i) we use PA only but not REP to
get more year variations (ii) we estimate conditional logits for all the
speciﬁcations; (iii) we use the UCDP/PRIO measure of civil-war inci-
dence; (iv) we try with different samples and run our regressions sepa-
rately for Sub-Saharan and commodity exporters countries and (v) we
replaced Natural Disasterj,t by the actual measure of GDP growth and
(vi) as in Collier and Hoefﬂer (2004), we control for the type of political
regime by adding a new variable that takes the value of 1 for democratic
countries deﬁned using the Polity IV measures of democracy. The effect
of U.S. political factors on the incidence of civil war withstands any of
these robustness checks.
4.6. The onset of civil war
Our theoretical analysis shows that foreign intervention increases the
occurrence of civil war by triggering new conﬂicts and prolonging
existing ones. For this reason, our main empirical investigation is on
the incidence of civil war, which captures both dimensions of a civil
war. We check now whether our insights persist once the onset of civil
is considered instead. We report in Table 9 our basic speciﬁcation (col-
umns 1–4). To give an idea of robustness we control for the Cold War
years (column 5) and for the number of conﬂicts around the world per
year (column 6).32 Although weaker, the effect of our variables is robust
to considering the onset of civil war, which we interpret as evidence of
the inﬂuence of U.S. politics on the emergence of civil conﬂicts abroad.33
4.7. A channel of inﬂuence
Wehave so far provided strong evidence of the empirical association
between the political situation in the U.S. and the incidence and onset of
civil war around the world. As this inﬂuence is often channeled by the
CIA, we investigate in this section whether the occurrence of CIA opera-
tions in conﬂicts abroad varies across the ideology and the approval of
the U.S. government. We rely on a measure of CIA interventions used
in Berger et al. (2013), which is based on recently declassiﬁed CIA covert
actions aiming at supporting or deposing foreign political leaders.34
As this variable is only available for the Cold War period, 1947–1989,
we restrict our sample accordingly.35 Unfortunately, this variable cap-
tures only successful CIA operations. That is, CIA operations that
succeeded in imposing the ally of the US. This is restrictive as our theo-
retical results do not depend onwhether the party supported by the for-
eign power wins or loses the conﬂict. These caveats notwithstanding,
the relationship between the incidence of successful CIA activities inand Greece) have been intervened as well. Other papers using similar measures of CIA op-
erations are Easterly et al. (2008), Dube et al. (2011).
35 Sullivan (2012) suggests, neither the success rate nor the frequency of interventions
varies signiﬁcantly across Cold War and non-Cold War.
Table 9
The onset of civil war.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conﬂict Onsetjt Conﬂict Onsetjt Conﬂict Onsetjt Conﬂict Onsetjt Conﬂict Onsetjt Conﬂict Onsetjt
Natural Disasterj,t 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
REPt 0.004⁎⁎ 0.004⁎⁎ 0.003⁎⁎ 0.003⁎⁎ 0.004⁎⁎ 0.004⁎⁎
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PAt −0.0002⁎ −0.0002⁎ −0.0002⁎ −0.0002⁎ −0.0002⁎ −0.0002⁎
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ΔlogGWPt 0.054 0.077⁎ 0.077⁎ 0.051 0.053
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.036) (0.039)
ΔlogGDPUS,t −0.0397⁎⁎ −0.0398⁎
(0.018) (0.018)
ΔlogOil Pricest 0.00001
(0.00002)⁎⁎⁎
Cold Wart 0.001
(0.004)
Number of Conﬂictst 0.0002
(0.0002)
Sample All All All All All All
Observations 4128 4128 4128 4128 4128 4128
R-squared 0.080 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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tence of politically-motivated foreign interventions abroad and, conse-
quently, it is interesting in its own right.Table 10
CIA successful interventions pear year, 1947–1989.
Democratic administration
CIA successful interventions per year (mean) 23.7
(8.20)
High presidential approval
CIA successful interventions per year (mean) 23.9
(7.43)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 11
The incidence of successful CIA operations.
(1) (2)
CIAjt CIAjt
REPt 0.012⁎ 0.013⁎⁎
(0.006) (0.006)
PAt −0.0001
(0.0002)
High PAt −0.014⁎⁎
(0.006)
ΔlogGDPUS,t
ΔlogGWPt
ΔlogOil Pricest
Sample All All
Observations 6106 6106
R-squared 0.584 0.584
Robust standard errors in parentheses
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.Table 10 provides suggestive evidence according to which themean
of (successful) CIA operations per year is larger for low presidential ap-
proval rates and under Republican administrations.Republican administration Difference p-Value
25.6 −1.9 0.001
(5.08)
Low presidential approval
25.5 −1.6 0.001
(5.46)
(3) (4) (5)
CIAjt CIAjt CIAjt
0.013⁎⁎ 0.041⁎⁎⁎ 0.018⁎⁎
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
−0.016⁎⁎ −0.035⁎⁎⁎ −0.023⁎⁎⁎
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
0.393⁎⁎⁎ 0.611⁎⁎⁎ 0.531⁎⁎⁎
(0.143) (0.161) (0.168)
−0.299⁎⁎⁎ −0.455⁎⁎⁎ −0.393⁎⁎⁎
(0.084) (0.098) (0.099)
−0.00001 0.00012⁎ 0.00001
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
All Commodity exporter Non OECD
6106 3978 4988
0.585 0.642 0.575
77F. Albornoz, E. Hauk / Journal of Development Economics 110 (2014) 64–78Given that the number of (successful) CIA operations is higher under
Republican administrations and in years with low U.S. presidential ap-
proval, we test this relationship further by estimating the probability
for a country j to experience a successful CIA covert operation in a
given year (CIAjt).36 Table 11 reports the results. As can be seen in col-
umn (1), the incidence of a CIA (successful) operation is higher under
Republican governments. However, the effect of presidential approval
is not signiﬁcant. Recall that PAt is a continuous variable ranging from
0 to 100, reﬂecting different degrees in presidential approval. Notice
as well that using CIAt reduces the number of observations by almost a
half, reducing considerably the power of the estimation. For this reason,
in the following estimations (columns 2 to 5) we use a dichotomous
version of PAt that takes the value of 1 if the level of presidential approv-
al is high (above themedian) and 0 otherwise. The effect of this variable
(High PAt) turns out to be negative and signiﬁcant. This is clear in all the
remaining estimations. In column (2), we report the effect of REPt and
High PAt alone. In column (3) we add ΔlogGDPUS,t, ΔlogGWPt and Δlog
Oil Pricest as controls. This result clearly relates the incidence of CIA op-
erations around the world with the U.S. political situation. The remain-
ing results show that this effect is stronger for developing countries. In
columns (4) and (5), we restrict the sample to commodity exporters
and non-OECD countries respectively. The coefﬁcients associated with
REPt and High PAt become stronger and gain signiﬁcance.
All in all, the estimations displayed in Table 11 suggest that the inci-
dence of CIA (successful) operations is politically motivated, especially
for developing countries, in the same way as the incidence and onset
of civil war.5. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we showed that the existence of a potentially interven-
ing country might trigger or prolong a civil war due to commitment
problems. We brieﬂy discuss another equally interesting channel how
a secretive intervention might affect civil war incidence in a bargaining
framework, namely by introducingpersistent information asymmetries.
While information asymmetries are a central theme in the literature on
rationalist explanations of war (see e.g. Jackson and Morelli, 2011) and
accepted as causes of war, it is generally argued that asymmetric infor-
mation cannot fully explain long lasting conﬂicts because both sideswill
learn the true information over time (Fearon (2004)). This insight is
destroyed in the presence of a potentially intervening country.Whenev-
er a deal is offered to one of the domestic parties, the side alliedwith the
foreign country is likely to be better informed about future investment
plans of the foreign government in case of victory and hence the ﬁnal
size of the spoils. It is also likely to have better information about the
amount of resources the foreign country is willing to provide in case
of a conﬂict. More importantly, the exact amount of foreign resources
depends on political factors in the foreign country that are highly uncer-
tain and better understoodwithin an alliance since they are not directly
observable from the domestic country. These ﬂuctuations are exoge-
nous to the domestic parties in conﬂict andmight lead to long lasting in-
formation asymmetries, which change over time and cannot (rapidly
and evenly) be learned. This way, foreign interventions generate persis-
tent uncertainty over the ﬁghting resources available for each party in
conﬂict which might explain even long-lasting conﬂicts.
The main theoretical novelty of the paper was to explicitly analyze
the incentives for a third party to intervene which leads to two clear-
cut predictions that provide an identiﬁcation strategy for the relevance
of foreign intervention on the incidence and onset of civil war. Both pre-
dictions are conﬁrmed for the case of the U.S. as a potential intervening36 Ideally, we would like to use REP and PA as instruments for CIA operations in order to
implement an instrumental variables approach. However, ideology and political support
may also inﬂuence other potential channels through which the U.S. may be involved in
foreign civil wars. Thus, it is possible that PA and REP do not satisfy the necessary exclusion
restriction.country: (i) civil wars are more likely to take place when the U.S. is
under a Republican government and (ii) the probability of civil wars de-
crease with the U.S. presidential approval rates. These empirical results,
relevant and novel in themselves, show that foreign inﬂuence is an im-
portant determinant of civil war around the world.Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.05.002.References
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